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Hobbes, Aristotle, and Human Happiness 
 
During his life in philosophy Thomas Hobbes engaged in several debates. Among his 
sparring partners the dearest to him was not a contemporary (such as Descartes, 
White, Bramhall, or Wallis) but Aristotle. This article explores the tension between 
Hobbes and Aristotle as it appears in metaphysics (including the study of nature), 
ethics (including psychology), and politics. The article will close with a comparison 
of their conceptions of human happiness. 
 
First impressions would suggest that Hobbes’s ridicule of Aristotle is thoroughly 
intended and his appreciation of the Philosopher sensationally low: 
 
 
 And I beleeve that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in natural 
Philosophy, than that which now is called Aristotles Metaphysics; nor more 
repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath said in his Politiques; 
nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethiques.1 
 
 
Hobbes’s phrasing is certainly impressive, but if the claims he makes are left 
unspecified, they remain merely words. Having said that, when explicating Hobbes’s 
position toward Aristotle and Aristotelianism two issues must be taken into 
consideration: the exact target and the exact content of Hobbes’s criticism.2 
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The interrelations between Hobbes and Aristotle and Hobbes and Aristotelianism 
have been studied at great length and in detail.3 To summarise the major conclusion in 
Hobbes’s own words: vain-philosophy or spiritual darkness derive “partly from 
Aristotle, partly from Blindnesse of understanding”.4 It is fairly clear that Hobbes’s 
primary target is a combination of selected Aristotelian doctrines and their adaptation 
to the Catholic dogma, or, to follow his own coinage, “Aristotelity”.5 To be content 
with this, I think, is to overlook the nuances of Hobbes’s position. Following Sorell, 
Hobbes’s stance can be classified as opposing (anti), (inter)dependent of, neutral (un), 
or in favour of. As we shall see, Hobbes was and remained anti-Aristotelian on a 
number of matters, but when his own thinking (in particular, his political theory) 
matured, he became on certain issues un-Aristotelian. Nevertheless, Hobbes was 
dependent on Aristotle and Aristotelianism (at least as a convenient target, but also, 
for example, in his psychology),6 and, ultimately, he agreed with and even valued 
Aristotle on certain subjects.7 So there is no single answer concerning the relationship 
between Hobbes and Aristotle or Hobbes and Aristotelianism, instead both need to be 
evaluated in the light of the more exact objections and agreements Hobbes puts 
forward in his writings. 
 
1. Study of nature and metaphysics 
When Hobbes alleges that Aristotle’s metaphysics is absurd, he criticises two things. 
First, this is a critique of metaphysics as such, that is, the way Aristotle and especially 
Aristotelianism understand first principles and concepts and the fundamental nature of 
reality. Equally important is what consequences their conception has for the study of 
nature.8 
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Hobbes comments on a number of issues in Aristotelian metaphysics,9 but the 
substantial differences arise on two levels. On a general level, the disagreement is 
between hylomorphism (from Greek hyle (matter) and morphe (form)) and 
materialism. To Aristotle and Aristotelians there are two substances, material (such as 
the body) and immaterial (such as the soul), whereas to Hobbes the only substance is 
matter. For the discussion at hand, the disagreement on a particular issue, the concept 
and the doctrine of essence, is more relevant. Hobbes sees two sorts of problems with 
this doctrine.10 First, it is a conceptual mess. At best, such concepts as ‘abstract 
essence’ and ‘substantial form’ are names of names, instead of things or ‘impressions 
of imagination’. But even this conclusion requires the rebuttal of the sensible 
understanding of the very nature of the world (that it consists of bodies) as well as 
concessions in reasoning. In fact, these concepts are “the names of Nothing”, the 
workings of deluded minds. The second problem is more pressing. Absurd 
metaphysics has practical consequences for the study of man and society.  
 
2. Ethics and politics 
When commenting on the ethics and politics of Aristotle and that inspired by him, 
Hobbes has many objections. Of these, two objections are in my opinion central: that 
we are by nature fit for society and the question of equality. 
 
At the beginning of the second part of Leviathan Hobbes summarises Aristotle’s zoon 
politikon argument as follows: 
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 It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably one 
with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred amongst Politicall 
creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements 
and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to another, what 
he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may 
perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same.11 
 
 
Two conclusions can be made from this passage. Firstly, Hobbes does not see any 
plausible reason to claim that sociability is natural, understood as the innate, universal 
quality of human beings. This is correct. The stronger claim, and the second 
conclusion, suggests that the case is the opposite, namely that there is an inbuilt 
tendency towards aggression and hostility in human beings; in other words, that 
human beings are asocial by nature. This conclusion is not correct. 
 
The questions of the general and more specific nature of human beings are related to 
Hobbes’s criticism of Aristotle’s metaphysics and the doctrine of separated essences. 
As in the case of nature, so in the case of man, there is no independent immaterial 
layer, say, the immaterial soul, that would constitute what it is to be a human being. It 
is true that Hobbes adopts the common definition of a human being: man is a rational 
animal, but then again the idea is so common that not much can be made out of this 
similarity. More can be said about how Hobbes and Aristotle understand the 
definition. To Hobbes, a definition is a name that singles out certain features that we 
take to be typical to human beings,12 whereas to Aristotle these characteristics 
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constitute the form or the essence of human being, which brings us to the core of 
Hobbes’s complaint. 
 
Hobbes’s critique of Aristotle’s psychology is based on his anti-essentialism. Though 
Hobbes speaks of mankind and its natural condition and of human nature in a way 
that suggests some universality, his understanding of human nature is qualified. It 
refers to some general patterns of behaviour, not to immutable intrinsic qualities. 
Hobbes is sure that we cannot ultimately define some sort of universal human nature, 
but he does not deny that we have some dispositions from birth that are common to us 
all. And yet again, it is a completely different thing how these are manifested in the 
case of an individual.13 
 
The above-mentioned stronger conclusion also fails for two further reasons. It is at 
odds with some textual evidence. Hobbes explicitly denies that human nature is the 
cause of asocial behaviour.14 Lastly, the stronger claim would require crossing, in 
modern terminology, the fact-value gap. That is to say, Hobbes’s critique is that were 
we to think in either way (human beings are social or asocial), further normative 
conclusions from this fact alone do not follow. That someone is strong does not make 
him or her morally superior. Similarly, if someone is not fit for society, this does not 
make him or her a better or worse person.15 
  
The idea of universal human nature is the first of the normative conclusions of 
Aristotelian political philosophy that should be abandoned, but it is not necessarily the 
primary target of Hobbes’s critique of Aristotelian ethics and politics. The salient 
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point is Aristotle’s claim that there is a natural inequality between human beings. 
Hobbes writes: 
 
 
 The inequality that now is, has bin introduced by the Lawes civill. I know that 
Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of his doctrine, 
maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser 
sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;) others to Serve, 
(meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he;) as if 
Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference 
of wit; which is not only against reason; but also against experience.16 
 
 
The idea here is not only that human beings are equal, but also that they are equal 
even when they are different from each other. This pluralistic reading of human 
nature, not a vulgar interpretation of the homo homini lupus formula is, I believe, 
more in accordance with Hobbes’s original view. 
 
To summarise, whereas Aristotle has a thick, objective, and uniform conception of 
human nature and is a supporter of natural inequality, Hobbes is a psychological anti-
essentialist who defends the natural equality of all human beings regardless of rank, 
wealth or other such artificial criteria. The contrast between the two thinkers does not 
seem to provide much room for agreement on the fundamental question of human 
happiness. 
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3. Human happiness 
In Aristotle’s eudaimonistic ethics natural sociability and human happiness are 
connected so that the sociability of human beings is of the highest kind in a sense that 
they are able to communicate, reflect, and agree on a common good – though, if I 
have understood the current scholarship correctly, it is the eudaimonia of an 
individual that is the ultimate goal of Aristotle’s ethics. He was also definite about 
what constitutes happiness and that every rational person is able to understand and 
willing to subscribe to this.17 When this is contrasted with another unforgettable 
passage from Leviathan: ‘the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a 
mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum 
bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall 
Philosophers”,18 the opposition between the two thinkers appears to be diametrical.  
 
It is true that in Hobbes there is no shared, universal, and uniform conception of 
human happiness and to him the kind of metaphysical conception of goodness 
embedded in Aristotle’s ethics is “but an idle term”,19 but despite this, curiously 
enough, Hobbes is not that far from his classical predecessors. He also has one 
common good, peace, which is in harmony with the real personal good of every 
rational human being, namely self-preservation.20 Self-preservation explains, on the 
one hand, how common and individual good are not mutually exclusive, and that 
there is a common denominator between individuals, on the other hand. And even 
though the tendency toward aggression is a lasting and central theme in his political 
theory, Hobbes suggests that human beings are rational enough to find a solution. 
Accepting Hobbes’s plural view of the aims of human life, felicity is different for 
different people and different for one person at different times, and there seems to be 
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no single goal in human life. This is non sequitur, though. Self-preservation is a 
starting point and not the only or even the primary goal of human life. We also strive 
for what Hobbes calls “commodious living”.21 We do not find in his political treatises, 
of course, a precise statement about what this commodious living (say reading novels 
in the morning and fishing in the afternoon) would consist of but this is in line with 
his anti-essentialism. In so far as the conception of the good life and the happiness of 
an individual does not damage others or pose a threat to public peace, others should 
not intervene in his or her way of life. As he writes in Leviathan: 
 
 
A fifth Law of Nature, is Compleasance; that is to say, That every man strive 
to accommodate himselfe to the rest. For the understanding whereof, we may 
consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society, a diversity of Nature, rising 
from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought 
together for building of an Aedifice.22 
 
 
To conclude: Hobbes critique of Aristotle is coherent starting from certain 
metaphysical issues and running through psychology and ethics all the way to politics. 
The central piece in this critique is the idea of essences, be it substantial forms, the 
idea of a universal human nature, or the idea of a universal common good as the part 
of fulfilment of our rational essence. Though Hobbes does not have a uniform and 
unequivocal conception of human happiness based on the essential qualities of human 
nature, he still maintains that there are certain common features in human nature as 
well as a set of principles that regulate the social interaction that we are able to agree 
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on. The modernity of Hobbes’s account is that he does not deny that human beings 
normally live together and manage to do this quite well, but he does object to the 
inclusive normative conclusions deduced from this empirical observation. Self-
preservation, the smallest common denominator, instead of some overarching view of 
what it is to be a human being, is what gives human happiness a framework. This 
outcome, Hobbes thought, was free of the linguistic manipulation of the key 
normative concepts of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and acknowledged the variety of goodness in 
private life. In these respects Hobbes provided a modern conception of the morally 
meaningful life. 
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